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I. Introduction
Observers of the Mexican criminal justice system today cannot
help but notice two remarkable developments. First, the country is
suffering through wrenching violence connected with the drug
trade. The violence amounts to far more than background noise,
rising to a level that some regard as a "civil war,"' or evidence
that Mexico could become a "failed state."2 Second, Mexico has
tProfessor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Wake Forest University
School of Law. This essay grows out of a speech delivered at the University of North
Carolina in April 2008. I am grateful to Professor Michael Corrado for organizing the
conference, and to the participants in the conference for their perceptive observations
about my project.
I Arthur Brice, Drug Violence Spins Mexico Toward 'Civil War', CNN, Feb. 19,
2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/americas/02/18/mexico.drug.violence/
index.html.
2 "The government thus becomes both an arena for competition among the cartels
and an instrument used by one cartel against another. That is the prescription for what is
called a 'failed state'-a state that no longer can function as a state." George Friedman,
Mexico: On the Road to a Failed State?, STRATFOR, May 13, 2008,
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embarked on procedural changes at both the federal and state
levels. The effort has achieved more than procedural tinkering at
the edges, creating some base-level changes at the constitutional
and statutory level in the legal machinery that responds to crime.
Many characterize this procedural transformation as a shift
from an inquisitorial to an adversarial model of criminal
procedure. I suggest, however, that the reforms do not simply
endorse the strengths of a particular adversarial fact-finding
method. Rather, the principal virtue of the new criminal codes in
Mexico turn on their efforts to balance powers. In particular, the
codes create meaningful competition for the public prosecutors in
Mexico during the investigation, trial, and punishment of alleged
criminals.
The drug violence in Mexico and the revision of state and
federal criminal codes in that country are both stories that deserve
intense scrutiny, standing alone. Taken together, they are riveting.
This article will review these developments and consider the
connections between them, both in the past and the future.
Looking back, did one development cause the other, or did they
both flow from a single cause? Looking forward, will the
procedural reform make it easier to respond to the drug violence?
Or will the drug violence distort or disable the procedural reform?
Writ large, these two developments in Mexico raise this basic
challenge for lawyers everywhere: Does procedure matter at all in
conditions of extreme violence and disorder? Does a debate about
adversarial versus inquisitorial justice amid ghastly violence
resemble a debate about iPods versus other MP3 players in a
household where nobody has enough to eat? Alternatively, is an
orderly and legitimate procedure the best hope under extreme
conditions of disorder?
II. Recent Drug Violence in Mexico
The troubles of the Mexican criminal justice system date back
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mexicoroadfailed_state; see also Ted Galen
Carpenter, Drug Gangs Winning the War for Mexico, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 6, 2009,
available at http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/editorial/outlook/6251540.html; see
also Sara Miller Llana, How Mexico is Waging War on Drug Cartels, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Aug. 16, 2009, at 10 (Pentagon report warned in Winter 2009 that Mexico
could become a "failed state").
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to the earliest days of the nation.3 The events that capture our
attention at present, however, began with the national presidential
election campaign of 2006. Three candidates represented the three
major parties in the effort to succeed Vincente Fox. Felipe
Calder6n, like Fox, was the nominee of the National Action Party
(the Partido Acci6n Nacional, or PAN), a right-of-center party.4
The Democratic Revolution Party (the Partido de la Revoluci6n
Democrdtica, or PRD), a left-of-center party, nominated Andrds
Manuel L6pez Obrador.5  Roberto Madrazo represented the
Institutional Revolutionary Party (the Partido Revolucionario
Institucional, or PRI).6 The election presented a novel experience
for the voters, because the PRI had dominated Mexican politics for
most of the twentieth century.7 After Vincente Fox broke the
political monopoly of the PRI, familiar political truths in Mexico
no longer applied.
Calder6n won an extremely close election, amid reports of
voting irregularities.8 The PRD disputed the legitimacy of this
outcome, and Obrador refused to recognize Calder6n as
President.9 As a result of the extended turmoil after the election,
Calder6n believed that he needed to take some unifying actions
early in his tenure. He moved against drug cartels to create a
sense of law and order that many voters were missing.
The new President's offensive against the cartels faced
daunting odds. "[Drug] cartels [brought] in billions of dollars
more than the Mexican government spent to defeat them."1 Cartel
3 See generally LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, LEGALIZED INJUSTICE:
MEXICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2001) (highlighting deeply-
embedded traditions in Mexican criminal procedure as the root of human rights
concerns).




7 See Dudey Althaus & Marion Lloyd, In What May be a Sign of What's to Come,
Calderon Takes Office Amid Brawling Congress, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 2, 2006, at Al.
8 See Mexico's Presidential Election: The Closest of Victories: Mexico's
Presidential Election, ECONOMIST, July 8, 2006, at 31.
9 See Chris Hawley, Mexican Says He's 'Legitimate' President; Lopez Obrador
Touring Country, Hasn't Conceded, USA TODAY, Dec. 19, 2007, at 8A.
10 Marc Lacey, In an Escalating Drug War, Mexico Fights the Cartels, and Itself,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2009, at Al.
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leaders spent a portion of their wealth bribing police, mayors, and
some higher-level officials, including some who worked in the
customs service and others in the prison system.11 Even in the
army, considered less corrupt than the police, "defense officials
estimated that 100,000 soldiers have quit to join cartels over the
previous seven years."12  President Calder6n himself received
death threats from cartels during the election campaign, suggesting
that the new President held a personal commitment to this policy
priority. 13
Because the cartels' bribery of the police remained a pervasive
problem, Calder6n was unable to call on existing structures of law
enforcement.14 Instead, he sent the army into the fight, devoting
more than 40,000 troops to the effort. 15 Mexico started extraditing
record numbers of drug suspects to the United States for trial,
revealing the loss of confidence of political leaders in the Mexican
judicial system. 16
The military offensive against the drug cartels offered some
early positive results. The campaign produced record seizures of
drugs, money, and guns, along with tens of thousands of arrests
which depleted the ranks of the four main Mexican drug cartels.17
Mexican authorities announced in April 2009 that they had
arrested over 60,000 people for drug crimes over the past two
years.18 The government claimed to have reduced the number of
"zones of impunity" from 2,204 down to 233."9 Enforcement
efforts against cartels uncovered a large number of high-level
officials and police officers who had collaborated in criminal
11 See Tracy Wilkinson, Mexico Under Siege: Calderon Shifts Tactics in Fight
With Drug Gangs, L.A. TIMES, May 28, 2009, at A20.
12 Lacey, supra note 10.
13 See id.
14 See James C. McKinley Jr., Mexico Hits Drug Gangs with Full Fury of War,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2008, at Al.
15 Enrique Krauze, Op-Ed., The Mexican Evolution, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2009, at
A27.
16 See Oscar Avila, Mexico Shifts Course, Aggressively Extradites Suspects to U.S.,
CHI. TRIB., Jan. 13, 2009.
17 See Marc Lacey, The War's Origins, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2009, at A12.
18 William Booth & Steve Fainaru, Mexican Drug Fight Nets 60,000 Suspects,
WASH. POST, May 1, 2009, at A10.




Drug organizations traffic in violence, and the cartels
responded violently to the government's offensive. There were
6,200 drug-related killings in 2008 (double the number of drug-
related killings in 2007). : l Some of these killings involved
multiple executions or mutilations of the victims' bodies.22 Some
of the deaths were attributed to intra-organization discipline, while
others resulted from struggles among the major cartels.23 Many of
the killings, however, targeted law enforcement agents, along with
a few killings of civilian bystanders.24
Soldiers in Mexico started to cover their faces while on patrol,
because their families faced retribution if the drug traffickers
recognized them. 25 The Mexican army allowed soldiers to grow
their hair longer, so they were not so easy to identify as soldiers
while off-duty.26 In one riveting incident early in 2009 in Ciudad
Judrez, drug traffickers demanded the resignation of police chief
Roberto Ordufia Cruz, and vowed to kill one police officer every
48 hours until he resigned.27 They carried out the threat by killing
the deputy chief of the department, another police officer, and a
prison guard.28 Ordufia resigned after a few days.29 The federal
government then deployed 5,000 soldiers to Ciudad Judrez and the
surrounding state of Chihuahua.3"
Mexicans actively debated the wisdom of Calder6n's
20 See Wilkinson, supra note 11.
21 Editorial, Death and American Guns in Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2009, at
A22. See Diana Washington Valdez, UTEP Drug Conference: New Cartel Methods
Widen Drug War's Toll, EL PASO TIMES, Sept. 21, 2009,
http://www.elpasotimes.com/ci 13384214 (explaining that 12,000 violent deaths
occurred during first two years of Calderon initiative).
22 See William Booth, 12 Federal Agents are Slain in Mexico, WASH. POST, July
15, 2009, at A9.
23 See Lacey, supra note 10.
24 See Booth, supra note 22.
25 See Lacey, supra note 10.
26 See id.
27 Marc Lacey, With Deadly Persistence, Mexican Drug Cartels Get Their Way,
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aggressive strategy against the cartels.3 For some, it was all a
colossal mistake: "Calder6n took a stick and whacked the
beehive."32  The involvement of the military in criminal law
enforcement also apparently resulted in an increase in human
rights violations against suspects.33 The government's plan
seemed inspired by the United States plan to counter narcotics in
Colombia, a dispiriting analogy that led some to predict a
prolonged violence in the country with little or no gains in public
order.34 Overall, however, the public still supports the Calder6n
initiative against the cartels.35
Remarkably, the extreme conditions of violence led the federal
govermment in Mexico to pass a law in August 2009 legalizing the
possession of some small amounts of drugs for personal
consumption.3' The government's stated strategy was to focus
more of its limited law enforcement resources on small-time
sellers of drugs.37
In the United States, concern about Mexico intensified.38 The
legalization of certain drug possession prompted worries that
greater drug use would spread to the United States, as easy access
31 See Lacey, supra note 10.
32 Id.
33 See Booth & Fainaru, supra note 18.
34 See Lacey, supra note 10; see also Leslie Berestein, Can Mexico Learn from
Colombia's Drug War?, S.D. UNION-TRIB., Feb. 16, 2009, at Al. See generally The
Center for International Policy's Colombia Program, "Plan Mexico" and Plan Colombia:
Similarities and Differences (2007), http://www.cipcol.org/?p=487 (last visited Feb. 19,
2010) (comparing the two plans and warning of the potential dangers of Mexico utilizing
a strategy similar to Colombia's).
35 See Mica Rosenberg, Mexican Army Will Fight Drug War for Years: Report,
REUTERS, Apr. 21, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/newsMaps/
idUSN1654810320090421; see also Editorial, A Promising Turn for Mexico, S.F.
CHRON., July 23, 2009, at D4.
36 See Oscar Avila, Mexico Weighs a Change of Focus on Drugs, CH. TRIB.,
October 19, 2008 at A7; Sara Miller Llana, Legalization of Drugs Spreads in Latin
America. Will the US Follow? CHRISTIAN SCI, MONITOR, Sept. 23, 2009, at 6; Tracy
Wilkinson & Richard Marosi, Mexico Shifts Tactics in Drug Battle, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 23,
2009, at A21.
37 See Marc Lacey, In Mexico, Ambivalence on a Drug Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24,
2009, at A4.
38 See generally Op-Ed., Surrender: Mexican Congress Weakens Drug Laws, S.D.




would be just across the border.39 Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton spoke in early 2009 about the possible spillage of Mexican
violence over the border into the United States, while
acknowledging the American role in creating the violent
environment.4 ° It is largely demand from the United States for
drugs that makes the drug business profitable, and the United
States' commerce in firearms that makes the cartel business more
deadly.4
III. Movement Away From the Inquisitorial System in Mexico
Which legal actors and institutions in Mexico can respond to
such drug violence? The relevant players in Mexican criminal
justice, and their capacity to respond to crime, are changing just as
rapidly as the drug violence in the country.
Mexico, broadly speaking, draws on the civil law tradition,
which employs an inquisitorial model of criminal justice.42 Like
much of Latin America, Mexico inherited its procedural template
from Spain.43 Today, however, Mexico offers a different take on
the civil law system than most other Latin American countries.44
The distinctions between the Mexican model and the inquisitorial
39 See Julie Watson, Mexico's Liberal New Drug-Use Law Worries U.S. Police,
THE DESERET NEWS (SALT LAKE CITY), Aug. 27, 2009, at Al.
40 See Ken Ellingwood, Clinton: U.S. Shares Blame for Mexico Ills, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 26, 2009, at Al. Secretary Clinton stated that "[w]e know very well that the drug
traffickers are motivated by the demand for illegal drugs in the United States, that they
are armed by the transport of weapons from the United States to Mexico." Id.
41 See id.; see James C. McKinley, Jr., U.S. Stymied as Guns Flow to Mexican
Cartels, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2009, at Al.
42 See Craig M. Bradley, Overview, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE
STUDY xv (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2d ed. 2007) (discussing the inquisitorial (or civil law)
approach and the accusatorial (or common law) approach to criminal procedure).
Professor Giulio Illuminati distinguishes accusatorial from inquisitorial systems. Giulio
Illuminati, The Frustrated Turn to Adversarial Procedure in Italy (Italian Criminal
Procedure Code of 1988), 4 WASH. UNIV. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 567, 568-69 (2005)
(viewing as accusatorial any model that strictly separates the investigating phase from
the trial. Under the inquisitorial model, "decisions are based on evidence gathered
unilaterally and in secret during the preliminary investigations by the investigating
judge.").
43 See STEPHEN ZAMORA ET AL., MEXICAN LAW 11 (2004); Maximo Langer,
Revolution in Latin American Criminal Procedure: Diffusion of Legal Ideas from the
Periphery, 55 AM. J. CoMP. L. 617, 628 (2007).
44 See Bradley, supra note 42, at 351-52.
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systems in other Latin American countries explain why criminal
justice reform in Mexico concentrates more on the role of public
prosecutors.45
A. The Traditional Latin American Model
The classic Latin American inquisitorial codes contain two
features that distinguish them from systems that tend to be more
adversarial. 46  First, the Latin American criminal codes generally
provide a written process that accumulates evidence over time, as
opposed to an oral process that concentrates proof into a shorter
time frame.47 Second, the inquisitorial codes assure the quality of
evidence through professional standards of the investigating
officer-that is, the judge-rather than through a testing of the
evidence from the defendant armed with several pre-declared
rights, or through presentation of evidence to lay adjudicators such
as jurors.48
Latin American inquisitorial codes typically divide the
criminal process into two stages: A pretrial investigation (sumario
45 Id. at 352-55.
46 See generally ZAMORA ET AL., supra note 43, at 364-68 (stages of the Mexican
criminal process); see also JOHN H. MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PEREZ-PERDOMo, THE CIVIL
LAW TRADITION 127-29 (Stanford University Press 3d ed. 2007) (1969) (general
descriptions of inquisitorial criminal justice systems).
47 See ZAMORA ET AL., supra note 43, at 364; cf JACQUELINE HODGSON, FRENCH
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE ACCOUNT OF THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION
OF CRIME IN FRANCE 31-32 (2005) (describing the similar system used for evidence
collection in France's inquisitorial system).
48 See ZAMORA ET AL., supra note 43, at 365, 368 (explaining the virtual absence of
jury trials and summarizing the evidentiary stage of Mexican criminal procedure); see
also Langer, supra note 43, at 629 (explaining the limited rights of defendants in
traditional inquisitorial Latin American systems); see also MERRYMAN & PEREZ-
PERDOMO, supra note 46, at 127-29 (comparing the common law accusatorial system
with the civil law inquisitorial system); cf John H. Langbein & Lloyd L. Weinreb,
Continental Criminal Procedure: "Myth" and Reality, 87 Yale L.J. 1549, 1551-67 (1978)
(describing the French and German versions of the inquisitorial tradition); cf Jenia
Iontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A Comparative View, 54
AM. J. COMp. L. 199, 215 (2006) (summarizing the German inquisitorial model). See
generally Abraham S. Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in
American Criminal Procedure, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1009, 1020 (1974) (focusing on the
role of the judge and the rights of the accused in the traditional inquisitorial model);
David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634 (2009) (contrasting
the inquisitorial system with the American adversarial system, and focusing on the rights
of defendants).
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or instrucci6n) and a verdict and sentencing phase (plenario or
juicio).49 The keystone of the process during both phases is the
dossier (expediente) "that the police and investigating judge
compile."5"
The judge takes charge of the investigation, which is "kept
secret from the defendant and [the defense] attorney."5  The
defense has no right to be present during the production of
evidence or to be apprised of charges before being interrogated;
with limited exceptions, pretrial detention of the defendant is
obligatory.52  In theory, the prosecutors hold no charging
discretion, so every time the police or judges learn about a
possible offense, they have to initiate criminal proceedings.53
At the verdict phase, the same judge who supervised the
investigation phase remains in control of the case.54 At this point,
the defendant and her attorney gain full access to the written
dossier and can request the production of evidence.55 The verdict
phrase is still "predominantly written [and] de facto [remains]
secret from the public."56 The resolution of factual disputes does
not include a jury.57
B. The Traditional Mexican Model
In Mexico, the central distinguishing feature of the system is
the expansive role of the public prosecutors.58  Mexican
prosecutors at the state and federal levels oversee police,
investigations, and prosecutions.59 These duties do not fall to the
49 Langer, supra note 43, at 629.
50 Id.; see also HODGSON, supra note 47, at 32; see generally ZAMORA ET AL., supra
note 43, at 364-68 (stages of the Mexican criminal process).
51 See Langer, supra note 43, at 629.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 629-30.




58 See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 13-14; David
Brennan, Mexico's Twin Challenges: Reforming its Criminal Justice System and
Combating Drug-Cartel Violence, ORANGE COUNTY LAWYER, Jan. 2009 at 38, 39.
59 See Brennan, supra note 58, at 38-39; Miguel Sarr6 & Jan Perlin, Mexico, in
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY 351 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2d ed. 2007);
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investigating judge, as they would in the traditional Latin
American model.6 °
In general, Mexican prosecutors face less competition from
other institutions than do prosecutors in other systems in the
Western hemisphere.61 Compared to prosecutors in the United
States, Mexican prosecutors do not face an especially active or
empowered defense bar.62 Compared to other Latin American
prosecutors, the prosecutors in Mexico do not defer to judges in
the overall conduct of investigations.63
Granted, at the trial stage, the prosecutorial role in the
traditional Mexican model is more limited than during
investigation. 64 Judges in the trial stage render written decisions
based on codes, applied mostly to written submissions of facts by
the prosecutor and defense counsel.65  The cases are decided in
camera. 66  In Mexico, a prosecutor need only show "sufficient
evidence of the crime," not proof beyond a reasonable doubt.67
The results that these institutions have achieved in Mexico
have not been especially encouraging. Many human rights groups
have chronicled the ills of Mexico's criminal justice system over
the last two decades.68 Some common themes appear in these
David A. Shirk & Alejandra Rios Chzares, Introduction: Reforming the Administration
of Justice in Mexico, in REFORMING THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN MEXICO 1, 20
(Wayne A. Cornelius & David A. Shirk eds., 2007).
60 See Langer, supra note 43, at 628-30.
61 See Shirk & Cdzares, supra note 59, at 20.
62 Id.
63 See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 14-15; see
Carlos Rios Espinoza, Redesigning Mexico 's Criminal Procedure: The States' Turning
Point, 15 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 53, 57-58 (2008). See generally Shirk & C~izares, supra
note 59, at 20 (explaining police investigation and prosecution in Mexico).
64 See Espinoza, supra note 63, at 58-60.
65 Brennan, supra note 58, at 39; see also Espinoza, supra note 63, at 82.
66 See ZAMORA ET AL., supra note 43, at 362-68; Leonard L. Cavise, The Transition
from the Inquisitorial to the Accusatorial System of Trial Procedure: Why Some Latin
American Lawyers Hesitate, 53 WAYNE L. REv. 785,792-93 (2007); Brennan, supra note
58, at 39.
67 See ZAMORA, ET AL., supra note 43, at 368; Brennan, supra note 58, at 40.
68 See, e.g. Amnesty Int'l, Unfair Trials: Unsafe Convictions, Al Index AMR
41/007/2003, Mar. 25, 2003; see LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note
3, at 73-77 (regarding allegations of coercion); see Espinoza, supra note 63, at 75; see
Joseph R. Crowley Program, Special Report, Presumed Guilty?: Criminal Justice and
[Vol. XXXV
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reports: Corruption of officials, impunity of criminals, and
inaccurate evidence.69 These problems do not flow inevitably
from the inquisitorial heritage of the Mexican system, but one can
see the connection between the most common malfunctions of the
system and the lack of a counterweight to prosecutors, particularly
at the investigative stage.70
Take, for instance, the perennial problems of bribery and
corruption. The prosecutors' dominant role in both investigation
and adjudication leads some of them to slight personal liberty
protections.71  The system, built around an assumption of
professional competence of a government official, leaves
prosecutors (and police, judges, customs officials, and prison
administrators) susceptible to bribery and corruption.72
The Mexican system leaves far too many crimes undiscovered,
with too many criminals untouched. There is a widespread
perception among Mexican citizens, confirmed in survey after
survey, that the system actors do not reliably investigate reports of
crimes.73 Even when investigations occur, the system ultimately
produces few convictions.74
Some attribute this inefficiency to the mandatory prosecution
rule, which prevents officials from prioritizing cases in a rational
way, leading to an overloaded system that allows bribery and other
corruption to determine which cases drop out of the system.75
Others suggest that the slow accumulation of proof in a primarily
written system prevents efficient case processing, meaning that the
cases take so long to wind through the system that prosecutors and
judges lose their urgency by the time the cases emerge from the
end of the assembly line.76
Human Rights in Mexico, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 801 (2000).
69 See Brennan, supra note 58, at 40.
70 Guillermo Zepeda Lecuona, Criminal Investigation and the Subversion of the
Principles of the Justice System in Mexico, in REFORMING THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE IN MEXICO 133 (Wayne A. Cornelius & David A. Shirk eds., 2007).
71 See Brennan, supra note 58, at 40.
72 See Bradley, supra note 42, at xvii-xx.
73 See Brennan, supra note 58, at 40.
74 Id.
75 See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 17; Zepeda
Lecuona, supra note 70, at 141-5 1.
76 See Brennan, supra note 58, at 39-40. See generally LAWYERS COMMITEE FOR
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Finally, the Mexican system relies too often on inaccurate
evidence and coerced testimony.77 The system offers defendants
no jury trial and other due process protections designed to test the
origins and accuracy of evidence. The presumption of regularity
and professionalism allows cases to go forward without regular
checks.79 In Mexico, this opens the way for torture by police to
obtain confessions, meaning that some convictions are based on
coerced confessions and other false evidence.8"
Why doesn't the defendant stop this from happening? Defense
lawyers are generally precluded from confronting accusers and
witnesses before the trial judge, leaving them with little
opportunity to challenge corrupted evidence." In addition,
defense counsel (especially appointed public counsel) are too often
limited in what they can offer any single client because of their
large caseloads.8 2
C. Mexican Code Revisions
While complaints about bribery, impunity, and coerced
confessions have dogged the Mexican system for many years,
some astonishing changes have appeared recently in Mexico's
criminal courts.83
The Mexican Congress amended the Constitution in 2007 and
2008 to require each Mexican state to study some proposed
reforms and to implement them within the state systems. 4 In
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 17-18 ("So few cases make it to the courts because the
investigations are not successful.").
77 See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 69-77
(explaining the evidentiary value of confessions); Espinoza, supra note 63, at 57-58.
78 See Espinoza, supra note 63, at 82.
79 Id. at 66, 82.
80 See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 70 ("In practice,
the principle of exclusion of coerced confessions from the evidence in a case or from the
consideration of guilt does not have any real application .... [N]either the Constitution
nor the criminal procedure codes explicitly establish that confessions obtained through
violence, torture or coercion must be excluded altogether from the case."); Unfair Trials:
Unsafe Convictions, supra note 68.
81 See Amnesty Int'l, Injustice and Impunity: Mexico's Flawed Criminal Justice
System, Al Index AMR 41/001/2007, Jan. 2007; Brennan, supra note 58, at 40.
82 See Brennan, supra note 58, at 40.
83 See id. at 40, 42.
84 See USAID/Mexico's Role in the Merida Initiative: Hearing Before the
[Vol. XX-XV
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March 2008, the Congress passed a new federal Criminal
Procedure Code.85 Ten states are further along, with Chihuahua
and Oaxaca actually conducting oral trials on a pilot basis.86
Mexico designated Proderecho (a "rule of law entity") to
coordinate reforms.87 The government looked to the United States
for help with reforms, so the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) is funding Proderecho and
several training programs for system actors.88 Funding came
through the Meridd Initiative, named for the city in the Yucain
that was the location for 2007 talks between Presidents Calder6n
and Bush, leading to this funding agreement.89
The first reform projects were based in the states of
Chihuahua, Oaxaca, and Nuevo Le6n.90 The emphasis there was
on developing advocacy skills for prosecutors and defense
attorneys to use at oral proceedings during the trial stage.9' After
suitable training, lawyers on both sides are now able to question
accusers, witnesses, experts, and others.92 They engage in oral
advocacy on the admissibility of evidence, guilt, and sentencing.93
These reforms emphasize strong educational programs not only for
the advocates, but also for judges, court personnel, police and
investigators.94
Most of Mexico's remaining states are reviewing and
Subcomm. On State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs of the H. Comm. on
Appropriations, 11 th Cong. 2 (2009) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Roger D.
Gamer, USAID Mission Director to Mexico).
85 Steven E. Hendrix, The Merida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: The
New Paradigm for Security Cooperation, Attacking Organized Crime, Corruption and
Violence, 5 LoY. U. CHI. INT'L L. REV. 107, 116 (2007-08).
86 Id.
87 See Brennan, supra note 58, at 41; see id.
88 See Hearings, supra note 84.
89 See COLLEEN W. COOK ET. AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, MERIDA INITIATIVE:
PROPOSED AUNTICRIME AND COUNTERDRUG ASSISTANCE FOR MEXICO AND CENTRAL
AMERICA 1 (2008); see also Cavise, supra note 66, at 788 (funding sources).
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considering these reforms to determine whether to follow suit.95
The next code revisions and training programs are targeted for
Baja California Norte (BCN).96 "[BCN's] new criminal procedure
code is modeled after Chihuahua's. [It] contains over 425 new
articles that regulate the conduct of police, prosecutors,
investigators, and courts. . . ."" BCN judges are also working
with the Orange County (California) Superior Court to learn about
court administration.98
D. Framing the Code Revisions
It is possible to frame these collected reforms as a movement
away from an inquisitorial system, toward the adversarial model of
criminal justice associated with the United Kingdom and the
United States.99 Some of these reforms do indeed move Mexico
away from a written procedure, toward a system that relies more
on oral presentation of evidence in a public forum.' ° They
transform the role of defense counsel, giving the attorney more
legal tools, such as due process rights that offer a basis for
challenging the legitimacy of the investigation and prosecution. 10
Such a framing of the reform movement might explain why the
United States government has funded and endorsed the use of
familiar institutions in Mexico.'0 2 This framing, however, misses
just as much as it reveals. It takes a convoluted account of
inquisitorial justice to explain why moves designed to involve
judges more heavily in investigations should be considered a move
in the direction of adversarial justice."3




99 See Langer, supra note 43, at 618 (explaining that while the reforms take
different shape they all share the transformation from the inquisitorial to the accusatorial
system).
100 See Shirk & Cizares, supra note 59, at 36 (presenting reforms implemented by
former Mexican President Vincente Fox).
101 See id.
102 See Hendrix, supra note 85, at 114 (noting that part of the Merida funding in
Mexico will go towards strengthening the institutions ofjustice).




The role changes for institutional actors in Mexico bring the
system closer to other Latin American systems that have crafted a
distinctive "accusatorial" system, a model that alters several key
features of the classic inquisitorial system without fully embracing
the common law model."0 The inspiration for procedural reform
in Mexico may be arriving from the South, at least as much as
from the North.'05
The reworking of institutional roles in Mexican criminal
justice can best be understood as a balance-of-power operation-
creating a competition among the actors where monopoly power
once existed-not just an endorsement of a particular adversarial
method of resolving factual disputes. 1°6 A purely adversarial
reform in Mexico would build a system around an oral trial, with
evidence presented by two parties of equal power and opposite
interests, decided by judges and juries who remain neutral between
those parties.0 7 What is happening in Mexico, however, goes
beyond the trial. The new codes limit the central importance of
the prosecutor during the investigative phase. They involve the
public in the investigation and trial phases by creating more open
hearings and open records. 108 They shift more responsibility into
the hands of defense attorneys. 10 9
While judges lose some authority over the presentation of
evidence in the trial phase, they counterbalance the prosecutor
during the investigative phase and retain the power to evaluate
evidence at trial and to sentence offenders. The new codes
enhance the distinction between the perspective and function of
the prosecutor and the judge, increasing the odds that these two
104 See id. at 621 (outlining the central aspects of the accusatorial system).
105 See id. at 621-26 (suggesting that Mexico reflects "triangular diffusion" of
procedural concepts, starting from periphery, moving to center of developed nations for
funding and endorsement, and back to periphery).
106 See, e.g., Sara Schatz et al., The Mexican Judicial System, in REFORMING THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN MEXICO (Wayne A. Cornelius & David A. Shirk eds.,
2007) 197, 221 (describing the horizontal shift in power away from the executive to
include the judiciary as well).
107 See generally Langer, supra note 43, at 621 (explaining what an adversarial
system looks like).
108 See Brennan, supra note 58, at 42.
109 See Brennan, supra note 58; cf Shirk & Ctzares, supra note 59, at 17-26
(discussing the role of the prosecution before Mexico's judicial reforms).
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actors will in fact compete with one another more often."'
On the whole, these reforms in Mexico make the field more
crowded. They offer more actors the power to influence the
outcome at more stages of the criminal process. In this sense,
Mexico is moving in the opposite direction from criminal justice
systems in the United States, where competition for the
administrative power of the prosecutor becomes more slight with
each generation."'
IV. Cause-Effect Relationship Between Drug Violence and
Procedural Reforms in Mexico
The fact that Mexico has embarked on transformative
procedural changes at the very time that drug violence is testing
the legitimacy of government raises deep questions about the
connection between the law and the society it serves."' Did the
violence cause the procedural change? Consider two hypotheses,
each offering a different causation story.
First, we will consider the "inevitability hypothesis."
According to this view, procedural reform would have happened
with or without the drug violence, and the fact that they occurred
at the same moment is simply a coincidence." 3 Second, we will
examine the "violence-as-causation" hypothesis. According to
this account, the extraordinary drug violence of 2007 made
possible a sweeping set of procedural changes." 4 The violence
was necessary to motivate actors to embrace major change." 5 The
initiative against drug cartels and the effort to revamp criminal
110 See generally Brennan, supra note 58, at 43 (describing how judges and lawyers
are all learning how to function in a new context).
II1 See Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal
Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79 (2005); see William T. Pizzi, Sentencing in the
US: An Inquisitorial Soul in an Adversarial Body, in CRIME, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE
IN A COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 65 (John Jackson, Mdximo Langer &
Peter Tillers eds., 2008).
112 Brennan, supra note 58, at 41.
113 See John J. Bailey & Wayne A. Cornelius, Reforming the Administration of
Justice in Mexico: Strategies and Requisites, in REFORMING THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE IN MEXICO 489, 491 (Wayne A. Cornelius & David A. Shirk eds., 2007).
114 See generally id. at 492 (describing the connections between administration of
criminal justice and issues of democratic governability).
115 See Hendrix, supra note 85, at 111.
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justice were from the beginning designed as companions, joint
objectives to promote a rule of law that the Mexican public would
accept as legitimate." 6
A. The Inevitability Hypothesis
Taking in the broad sweep of Mexican history, perhaps the
criminal code revisions are happening now because of larger
changes in the social structure." 7 In this view, the appearance of
vivid crime problems is only a distraction; these procedural
changes were inevitable.118
It is commonplace among lawyers and scholars based in
accusatorial systems to note that the inquisitorial systems are
based on a relationship of trust between citizens and government
agents.1 9 As a society becomes less homogenous, it will embrace
more explicit declarations of rights and insist on more active
checks on official power rather than relying on professionalism
and tradition. 2  In this telling, accusatorial justice inevitably
arrives in the wake of democracy and social diversity. 2' The loss
of the PRI monopoly on political power with the election of
Vicente Fox in 2000 signaled the arrival of a more pluralistic and
democratically competitive nation.122 It was only a matter of time
before the justice system, with its obvious flaws, reflected this
larger social change.
Mdximo Langer offers a similar account of procedural reforms
in other Latin American countries.12  Fourteen Latin American
countries have introduced criminal procedural reforms in the last
fifteen years. 124 An active network of Latin American lawyers and
other experts drafted and implemented the codes, structuring the
116 Id.
117 See Langer, supra note 43, 631-51.
118 Id.
119 See Bradley, supra note 42, at xviii ("[T]he state is the benevolent and most
powerful protector and guarantor of public interest ... .
120 Id. at xxi.
121 Id.
122 Joseph L. Klesner, The End of Mexico's One-Party Regime, 34 POL. SCL & POL.
107, 111 (2001).
123 Langer, supra note 43, at 617.
124 Id.
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changes as a movement away from inquisitorial procedures and
toward accusatorial procedures.125  The network experts
emphasized that this was a regional trend, and thus created a code
"cascade effect."' 2 6  Reform supporters had differing political
orientations, with different priorities for the problems that
accusatorial reforms should address.'27 Legislatures considered
the reforms to be technical, deriving from legal expert
committees.128 Mostly they were adopted with little opposition."2 9
In the end, countries embraced the reforms when governance
and public debate became more democratically competitive. 3 °
Mexico was slow to move to embrace accusatorial justice because
it was slower than Argentina and other Latin American nations to
develop a democratically competitive political culture.' 3'
Granting the explanatory power of this view of the connection
between legal institutions and the political pluralism of a society,
it all seemed to operate too promptly in Mexico. If Vicente Fox
was elected in 2000, was an accusatorial justice system truly
inevitable by 2008, when the Congress amended the constitution?
While these social dynamics may have created conditions that
were favorable both for unexpected national election results 3 2 and
unprecedented procedural changes, perhaps other factors can help
explain their arrival so close in time.'33
B. Violence-as-Causation Hypothesis
This broad-brush talk of social and political conditions could
strike some as missing the obvious and immediate connections
between two major events, one following immediately after the
other.'34 Current crime conditions played a larger part in Mexico
125 Id.
126 Id. at 619.
127 Id. at 661.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 662.
130 Id. at 632.
131 Id. at 664.
132 See Klesner, supra note 122, at 107.
133 See Langer, supra note 43, at 633.
134 See Hendrix, supra note 85, at 115.
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than in other Latin American procedural reforms. '35
Perhaps the Calder6n government thought of the offensive
against drug cartels and the revamping of the criminal justice
systems as two parts of a comprehensive strategy to promote order
and the rule of law.136 The level of violence after the 2006
elections produced a clear need for the government to take visible
action to fix a broken system.137 The use of an accusatorial
framework was a way to signal profound change internally,'38 and
to encourage help and endorsement from external sources.'39
Externally, the embrace of the "accusatorial" label makes the
Mexican procedural changes accessible and attractive to funding
sources in the United States. 140 The USAID funding targeted both
the law enforcement functions and the "rule of law" functions. 4'
Funding goes to civilian agencies for technical advice and training
to strengthen institutions of justice: Vetting for new police force
members; case management software to track investigations
through trial,; new offices of citizen complaints and professional
responsibility; and witness protection programs. 142
At the same time, the accusatorial packaging of these reforms
appealed to a broader external network of Latin American lawyers,
judges, and activists, who aimed for more active defense and
prosecution involvement in testing of evidence at trial, and more
discretion for prosecutors and judges to prioritize among cases."'
The language of a party-centered adversarial criminal process long
ago arrived in Mexico from the South, not from the North. 144
Criminal code revisions could also serve some useful internal
functions for the Calder6n government. First, a more accusatorial
process seemed the well-targeted answer for the problem of
135 Id.
136 Id. at 110-11.
137 Id. at 117.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 113.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 120.
142 Id. at 114.
143 See Langer, supra note 43, at 618-19.
144 Id. at 667-68.
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system capacity."' Tougher law enforcement must operate
together "with a justice system that can more quickly and broadly
prosecute and punish criminals." '146 Increased arrests must be
matched by "increased case loads to avoid the appearance of
criminal impunity."'47 The accusatorial system, with its emphasis
on prosecutorial discretion and plea bargaining, offers a way to
expand the reach of the system.'48 For instance, "in Mexico's first
week of ... oral trials in the State of Chihuahua, seventy percent
of forty-eight reviewed cases were resolved through one of the
seven case resolution alternatives permitted by the reformed
criminal codes of procedure."' 49 Before the code reforms, these
cases could have gone on indefinitely. 150
Accusatorial reforms could also target the loss of public
confidence in the Mexican system.' 5' It can be said that
"Mexicans long ago lost faith in their judicial authorities.' '152 A
study reported in the New York Times found that "ninety percent
of those who have been victims of a crime never reported the
episode to the authorities, convinced it would do no good.'
153
Studies have also found that less than four out of every 100 people
arrested are actually convicted.'54 A system that depends more on
lay adjudicators and public oral trials could demonstrate to its
citizens that the system answers to their priorities."'
The legitimacy of government in the eyes of the public-
including those who are the targets of government punishments-






151 See generally Jennifer L. Johnson, When the Poor Police Themselves: Public
Insecurity and Extralegal Criminal-Justice Administration in Mexico, in LEGITIMACY
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 167 (Tom R. Tyler ed., 2007)
(discussing the distrust Mexico's poor has of the Mexican criminal justice system).
152 Lacey, supra note 10, at Al.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 See Bradley, supra note 42, at xvi; Editorial, Mexico's New Justice: A Proposed
Overhaul of the Country's Court System is Good News for its People and the U.S., L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 7, 2008, at A22 [hereinafter Mexico's New Justice].
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is a principal goal of procedure. In the United States, years of
effort to promote the concept of "community policing" and the
more recent efforts to create "community prosecution" have aimed
to improve broader public perceptions that the system promotes
public safety while respecting local priorities and values.'56
Legitimacy in the eyes of the community turns on a perception
that parties can speak and be heard, and that officials treat parties
equally without favoritism.'57
Will the ongoing revisions to Mexican criminal codes create
more public confidence and legitimize the system in their eyes?
This is not a question one can answer in the abstract. While the
efficiencies of an accusatorial system may create a more timely
system that appears more responsive to public concerns, the
tradition of prosecutorial discretion opens up the danger of
unequal or unexplained treatment of cases.' Reforms that
empower defense counsel to confront witnesses and test
prosecutor case quality will only be valuable if the lawyer seizes a
fleeting moment at trial. Could not a written record offer more
reliable chances to point out inconsistencies and weaknesses?
In some ways, the inquisitorial system-with its expectation
that judges explain all their decisions in writing-might promote
public confidence more easily than an accusatorial system."'
Certainly a U.S.-style system that relies overwhelmingly on guilty
pleas obtained from defendants who would pay an enormous
penalty for going to trial is far from ideal as a way to develop and
156 Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Policing, 90
CAL. L. REv. 1513, 1527-28 (2002). See Kay L. Levine, The New Prosecution, 40 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 1125 (2005) (examining the societal implications of the shift from the
traditional prosecutorial focus on convictions to the new prosecutorial focus on crime
reduction). See generally Walter J. Dickey & Peggy A. McGarry, The Search for Justice
and Safety Through Community Engagement: Community Justice and Community
Prosecution, 42 IDAHO L. REv. 313 (2006) (exploring how cities across the United States
are integrating community justice and community prosecution with the tradition role of
public law enforcement).
157 See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 5-6 (1990); Tracey Meares, The
Legitimacy of Police Among Young African-American Men, 92 MARQ. L. REv. 651, 659
(2009); Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People
Help the Police Fight Crime in their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 239
(2008).
158 See Mexico's New Justice, supra note 155.
159 See Bradley, supra note 42, at xvi-xvii.
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test a full and accurate factual record. 160
While there is no inherent advantage in the package of new
procedures that Mexico is now embracing, the newness of these
procedures offers an advantage. Just as it was important to replace
police officers in Mexico-perceived as corrupt at every level-
with more widely-trusted soldiers from the armed forces, so it is
important to replace an older, distrusted judicial system with
something that is perceived as a clean sweep.16' In the long run,
replacement of police forces with armed forces might create more
problems than it solves, but the move does reset an intolerable
status quo. 162 The same might be said of criminal code revisions
that create more charging discretion and open the door for more
plea bargaining. 163
V. Conclusion: Federalism and the Legitimacy Question in
Mexico
There is an encouraging and intriguing aspect of the
foundational procedural changes happening in Mexico: which will
allow for some direct comparisons. 164  Since the thirty-three
Mexican states will all eventually try their own reform packages,
we can compare results among states. 165 The reforms have started
in three states and will spread to others quickly. 166 If one Mexican
state employs jury trials and others do not, we may very well be
able to notice any effects on crime rates and legitimacy of the
system. 167
Furthermore, such comparisons are likely to happen in
Mexico, because of the involvement of U.S. experts and funding
sources for training purposes. 168  Many will be watching to see
whether the Mexican states start to operate, for better or worse,
160 See id. at xvii.
161 Brennan, supra note 58, at 41.
162 Lacey, supra note 10, at Al.
163 Bradley, supra note 42, at xvii-xviii.
164 See Brennan, supra note 58, at 41.
165 See id.
166 See id. at 42.
167 See id. at 44.
168 See id. at 42.
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more like the state-level systems in the United States.'69
Finally, we must keep ourselves open to the discouraging
possibility that the comparisons will not matter. i0 What if
procedural variety all leads to the same unhappy results in crime
control and legitimate outcomes? 17' As lawyers and legal scholars,
we must remain humble enough to say that when this many people
are dying, it may not matter whether the system is accusatorial or
inquisitorial.172
169 See Mexico's New Justice, supra note 155, at A22.
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